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SUSPENSION OF INMATE'S VISITING
PRIVILEGES DOES NOT MANDATE DUE
PROCESS PROTECTION: KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS V.
THOMPSON, 109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989)
The fourteenth amendment's due process clause' protects individu-
als from erroneous and arbitrary government action.2 Courts have his-
torically denied prisoners' fourteenth amendment claims.3 Only
recently have the courts established that the Constitution4 and various
1. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
2. The courts have broadly interpreted the kinds of liberty interests which the four-
teenth amendment protects. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1959) (the
term liberty within the due process clause is not confined to bodily constraint); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922) (liberty includes the right to contract, to engage in a
common occupation, to acquire knowledge, to marry, establish a home and raise chil-
dren, to worship God and "generally enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
3. See, eg., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). In Ruffin,
the court held that "the convicted felon has as a consequence of his crime, not only
forfeited his liberty, but all of his personal rights except those which the law in human-
ity accords to him. He is for the time being a slave to the state." Id. at 796. Since
Ruffin, courts have found that prisoners are not exempt from all freedoms granted by
the Constitution. Under the first and eighth amendments, courts have upheld prisoners'
constitutional rights in situations concerning racial discrimination, inmate assault, cor-
poral punishment and restraints on the freedoms of religion and speech. See Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (restraint on religion); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1969)
(religious speech); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971) (restraint on reli-
gion); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (corporal punishment); Battle v.
Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974) (racial discrimination).
4. See generally Gooding, The Impact of Entitlement Analysis: Due Process in Cor-
rectional Administrative Hearings, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 151 (1981). A protected liberty
interest arises from the Constitution when core values such as life, liberty and property
are threatened by government action. This type of analysis is called impact analysis.
Impact analysis focuses on whether governmental action will result in an adverse im-
pact on the individual. Id. at 155. See also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)
(law libraries or assistance from persons with legal training required in order to preserve
inmates Constitutional right of access to the courts); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
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state law sources5 endow prisoners with a protected liberty interest.6
Prisoners are now utilizing due process to challenge adverse changes in
their conditions of confinement.7 At the same time, however, prison
officials retain broad, discretionary power to effectively operate pris-
ons.' In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,9 the
Supreme Court held that a Kentucky prison regulation did not limit
official discretion enough to grant inmates a state-created liberty inter-
est in visitation privileges."
(1972) (termination of parole requires due process review because parolee's liberty is
affected); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1981) (inmate's involuntary transfer to a mental
hospital implicates a liberty interest).
5. State created liberty interests can arise from state statutes. See, eg., Paul v. Da-
vis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976) (the right to operate a motor vehicle, once granted by a
state motor vehicle statute, becomes a liberty interest and cannot be retracted without
due process of law). Regulations promulgated by state agencies can also give rise to
liberty interests. See, eg., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison regulation
created a liberty interest in good time credit).
6. See generally Comment, Entitlement Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974
DuiK L.J. 89. Entitlement analysis focuses on whether the government through stat-
utes, administrative rules or regulations has created a protected liberty interest. A
broad approach to entitlement analysis includes identification of potential sources of
liberty interests, such as individual practices and expectations. Id. at 100. For an alter-
native to both impact and entitlement analysis, see Note, Due Process Behind Bars--The
Intrinsic Approach, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1067 (1980). See infra note 65 for peti-
tioner's alternative to entitlement analysis in Thompson.
7. Using entitlement analysis, the courts have found state-created liberty interests
within the prison context. See infra notes 31-35, 41-52 and accompanying text. See also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison regulation created liberty interest in
good time credit); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (Nebraska
statute created a protected liberty interest in parole release); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
461 (1983) (inmate could not be placed in administrative segregation without due pro-
cess proceedings because prison regulation created a protected liberty interest in re-
maining in the general prison population); Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1987) (state law mandated that revocation of work release required due process).
8. See, eg., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). The
Court in Jones stated:
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison ad-
ministration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a
healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, the
federal courts have a further reason for deference to appropriate prison authorities.
Id. at 126.
9. 109 S. Ct. 1904 (1989). Thompson was the class representative on behalf of the
class of inmates at the Kentucky State Reformatory. Id. at 1905.
10. Id. at 1911. The Court found that, absent certain criteria, the Kentucky regula-
tion did not sufficiently limit official discretion to create an expectation that a visit
would occur. Id. See infra notes 11-20 and accompany text for a discussion of the facts
and for text of the regulation in question.
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In Thompson, prison officials suspended visitation privileges for two
inmates at the Kentucky State Reformatory without affording prison-
ers an opportunity for a hearing. 1 These inmates brought a class ac-
tion suit against the prison,12 alleging that suspension of visiting
privileges without a hearing violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 3 At the time the suit arose, two state documents
regulated visiting privileges in the reformatory. First, a consent decree
directed prison officials to continue an open visitation policy. 14 Sec-
ond, the reformatory issued its own procedural memorandum provid-
ing that although prison officials retain discretion in the manner of
visitation, they should respect the rights of inmates to have visitors."1
The memorandum further stated that prison officials could exclude vis-
itors if their presence would endanger or interfere with the operation of
the prison.16 The District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
11. 109 S. Ct. at 1907. In one instance, the prison denied Kenneth Bobbit's mother
visitation privileges for six months because she had brought an individual to the institu-
tion who had previously been denied visiting privileges for smuggling contraband into
the prison. In the second instance, the prison denied inmate Kevin Black's mother and
girlfriend visitation privileges for a limited time after officials discovered contraband on
Black's person immediately after a visit. Id.
12. Thompson brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States to the
deprivation of any rights privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law for redress.
13. 109 S. Ct. at 1904. See Thompson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Department
of Corrections, 833 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting a court
order requiring defendants to establish procedures that prison officials must employ
before restricting visitation. These procedures include notice and hearings. Id. at 616.
14. 833 F.2d at 616. The consent decree addressed conditions of confinement at the
two institutions. The decree provided in pertinent part: "The Bureau of Corrections
encourages and agrees to maintain visitation at least at the current level with minimal
restrictions ... Defendants shall continue their open visitation policy." Kendrick v.
Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 37 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
15. 109 S. Ct. at 1906. The policy statement of the memorandum reads in pertinent
part:
Although administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits, it is the
policy of the Kentucky State Reformatory to respect the rights of the inmates to
have visits in the spirit of the Court's decision and the consent decree, while insur-
ing the safety and security of the institution.
Id.
16. Id. The memorandum provided a non-exhaustive list of specific reasons for ex-
cluding a visitor. The memorandum stated that prison officials could refuse admittance
if the prison official had reasonable grounds to believe that the visitor presents a clear
and probable danger to the safety and security of the institution or would interfere with
1990]
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held that the language of the consent decree entitled prisoners to a pro-
tected liberty interest in open visitation.17 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed and remanded, basing its decision not only on the language of
the consent decree but also on the reformatory's regulations and poli-
cies.18 The Supreme Court reversed," holding that the Kentucky
prison regulation did not sufficiently limit official discretion in order to
give inmates a state-created liberty interest in receiving visitors.2"
The fourteenth amendment2" protects an individual from govern-
mental deprivations of liberty or property without due process of law.22
The due process clause, however, does not protect an unlimited
number of liberty and property interests.23 Rather, an individual must
its orderly operation. Id. at 1907. Specifically, the list included: a past record of dis-
ruptive conduct; alcohol or drug influences; failure to show proper identification or sub-
mit to a search; if the visitor is directly related to the prisoner's criminal behavior; or if
the visit is detrimental to the inmate's rehabilitation. Id. at 1907 n.2, citing Kentucky
State Reformatory Procedures Memorandum, No. KSR 16-00-01 (issued and effective
Sept. 30, 1985).
17. 109 S. Ct. at 1907. The district court found the language of the consent decree
mandatory within the meaning of Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), because it
required the continuation of an open visitation policy. Id. Subsequently the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs possessed a protected liberty interest in open visitation.
Id. See infra notes 50-56 for a discussion regarding the statute in Hewitt.
18. Thompson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Corrections, 833
F.2d 614, 619 (6th Cir. 1987). The Sixth Circuit concluded that the combination of the
mandatory language in the consent decree and the specific criteria in the memorandum
created a protected liberty interest. Id. The court remanded:
for a further determination of precisely which set of regulations covers the plaintiff
class, the procedures memorandum, which we find does create a liberty interest,
purports to cover visits at the Kentucky State Reformatory; it is unclear from the
record what set of regulations govern visits in other parts of the Kentucky system.
Id.
19. Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined. 109 S. Ct. at 1906.
20. Id. at 1909-10.
21. See supra note 1.
22. Judicial review of alleged due process violations involves two issues. First, does
the government action in question infringe upon an interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment? Second, if it does, what procedures are due the affected party? See, eg.,
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (applies this two part test in a corporal
punishment claim).
23. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). In Roth,
no state statute or university rule or policy secured a professor's interest in re-employ-
ment and the fact that plaintiff had an abstract hope and "concern" of being rehired did
not create a protected interest. However, Roth introduced the possibility that state law
could be a source of property interests protected by the fourteenth amendment.
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possess a legitimate claim to a protected interest.24 Protected interests
may have independent constitutional origins which command constitu-
tional protection.25 Due process protections do not extend to liberty
interests that the Constitution does not specifically recognize, unless
individual states have created protected interests through statutes or
26agency regulations.
In 1972, the Supreme Court began extending procedural due process
rights to prisoners by protecting prisoners from arbitrary changes in
their conditions of confinement.27 Beginning with Morrissey v.
Brewer,28 the Court held that revocation of a prisoner's parole requires
due process.29 Focusing on the gravity of the change in prisoner's con-
ditions of confinement due to parole revocation,3° the Court reasoned
that procedural due process must be accorded whenever a prisoner suf-
fers such a grievous loss.31
Two years after Morrissey, the theory of statutory entitlement gradu-
24. Id. at 577.
25. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of protected interests
arising from the Constitution.
26. See, eg., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976) (state-created liberty and
property interests are entitled to due process protection). See supra note 5 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of protected liberty interests created by state law.
27. During much of the twentieth century, courts invoked the hands-off doctrine to
bar inmates from the protections of the due process clause. Berger, Withdrawal of
Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands-off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1978). This doctrine stated that "courts are without the
power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with prison rules or regulations
except in extreme circumstances." Young v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir.
1971). Three justifications existed for the hands-off doctrine. First, judges did not pos-
sess the expertise in correctional matters. Second, courts lacked adequate remedies for
correctional deficiencies. Third, conditions of confinement were privileges, not rights,
and thus not reviewable. See Berger, supra note 27, at 2-5. See also Note, Involuntary
Interprison Transfers of State Prisoners after Meachum v. Fano and Montanye v.
Haymes, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 848-49 (1976), which concentrates on the concept of
separation of powers as the basis for the hands-off doctrine.
28. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
29. Id. at 482. The Court noted, however, that parole revocation does not permit
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal trial. Id. at 480.
30. Id. The Court stated that "the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, in-
cludes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'griev-
ous loss' on the parolee and often on others." Id. at 482. See supra note 4 for a
discussion of impact analysis.
31. The Court based its conclusion that a parolee's loss of liberty is grievous on the
fact that the liberty granted a parolee is analogous to the liberty experienced by persons
who have never been convicted of a crime. 408 U.S. at 482.
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ally replaced the concept that an adverse change in a prisoner's envi-
ronment directly triggered the due process clause.32 In Wolff v.
McDonnell,33 a statute awarded good time credit, which shortened a
prisoner's term of confinement, according to a fixed formula. If prison
officials found an inmate guilty of a serious breach of prison discipline,
they could reduce the inmate's good time credit.34 Based upon this
statute, the Supreme Court held that prisoners possessed a state-cre-
ated protected liberty interest in good time credit.35 The Court argued
that, although there is no constitutional right to good time credit, a
liberty interest may be a statutory creation of the state. The opinion
did not explain exactly how the statute created an entitlement to due
process protection.35 The Court did intimate, however, that entitle-
ment hinges upon limitations of official discretion because prison offi-
cials could reduce good time credit only for serious misbehavior.37
The Supreme Court began to specify how a state statute creates a
protected liberty interest in Meachum v. Fano.38 In Meachum, the
Court held that a Massachusetts statute did not give a prisoner the
32. Courts generally agree that Wolff established the use of entitlement theory in
the prison context. See, e.g., Baum, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Interstate
Prison Transfers, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1387 (1983). By specifically basing its holding on
entitlement analysis, the WolffCourt abandoned impact analysis. Id. at 1399 n.48. See
generally Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules? in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25
(Summer ed. 1970) for a discussion of the possible reasons for this shift in methods.
33. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
34. Id. at 546-47. The relevant prison regulation provides in part: "Disciplinary
action taken and recommended may include but not necessarily be limited to the follow-
ing: reprimand, restrictions of various kinds, extra duty, confinement in the Adjust-
ment Center, withholding of statutory good time and/or extra earned good time, or a
combination of the elements listed herein." Id. at 551 n.8.
35. 418 U.S. at 558. The Court stated that "the state having created the right to
good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major
misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced
within the fourteenth amendment. . ." Id. at 557.
36. Id. However, the Court points out that the interest of prisoners in disciplinary
procedures is included within the liberty protected directly by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 557. See Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973) (Supreme Court
considered the prisoner's claim that he had been deprived of good time credit without
due process a proper subject for habeas corpus proceedings).
37. 418 U.S. at 557-58.
38. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). In order to create a protected liberty interest, Meachum
interprets Wolff as requiring the presence of minimum procedures in compliance with
state law or on the occurrence of specified events. For example, good time credit could
only be forfeited for misconduct. Id. at 226-27.
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right to remain in the prison of his or her original incarceration. 39
Consequently, an official decision to transfer an inmate to another in-
stitution within the state did not require procedural due process protec-
tion.4° Focusing its statutory analysis on the degree of discretion that
the statute vested in prison officials, the Court found that the statute
did not create a protected liberty interest, because it did not condition
transfer on the occurrence of specific events.41 The Court concluded
that when a state imposes no statutory restraints on the discretion of
prison officials, a prisoner cannot justifiably expect that he will retain
certain privileges absent the occurrence of specified events.42 There-
39. 427 U.S. at 227. Meachum is often interpreted as rejecting all correctional ap-
plications of impact analysis. The Court stated that any "grievous loss" suffered by a
prisoner as a result of an administrative decision was not sufficient to trigger due pro-
cess safeguards. Id. at 224. The Court affirmed Meachum in Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 242 (1976) ("as long as conditions or degree of confinement to which the
prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise
violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an in-
mate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight"). See generally Note, Pro-
cedural Due Process in Prisoners' Rights: The State Giveth and The State Taketh Away,
57 B.U.L. REV. 387, 394-404 (1977) (discussion of Meachum and related cases address-
ing prisoners' rights).
Despite the holdings in Meachum and Montanye, several courts continued to employ
impact analysis. See Clifton v. Robinson, 500 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (endorse-
ment and application of impact analysis after Montanye). Cf Muhammad v. Carlson,
845 F.2d 175, 178 (8th Cir. 1988) (although transfer to a prison's AIDS unit presented
the same stigmatization as transfer to a mental hospital, it did not amount to an in-
fringement of inmate's protected liberty interest absent statutory basis for such a find-
ing). But cf Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (inmates' involuntary transfer to a
mental hospital constitutes the kind of grievous loss that requires due process protec-
tion, but the Court refrained from relying solely on impact analysis by finding that the
state created a protected liberty interest in the same right).
40. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 227. The Court would not go so far to hold that
transfer to substantially more burdensome conditions triggered due process protection.
Id. at 225. Some commentators have determined that the holding in Meachum is a
return to the hands-off doctrine in inmate litigation. See Schwartz, OHm v.
Wakenikona: The Hands-off Doctrine Gains Further Support In Prison Transfer Deci-
sions, 10:2 CRIM. AND CIv. CONFIN. 144 (1984).
41. 427 U.S. at 226-28. The Court also premised its decision on several policy con-
siderations. First, the Court concluded that the federal courts should not supervise
state prisons, the administration of which is of acute interest to the states. Secondly, the
Court reasoned that discretionary decision-making of prison officials is not the business
of the judiciary. Id. at 228-29.
42. Id. at 228. The Massachusetts statute provides in pertinent part: "The commis-
sioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner from one correctional institution of the com-
monwealth to another...." Id. at 227 n.7, citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 97 (West
1974). The Court found essentially no restraints on the prison official's discretion. Id.
at 228.
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fore, a statute which gives prison officials unbridled discretion and that
does not violate a legal interest or right under state law fails to create a
protected liberty interest.43
The Supreme Court, in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates," in-
troduced the possibility that the mere presence of substantive limita-
tions on official discretion was insufficient to create a protected liberty
interest. The Nebraska statute at issue in Greenholtz contained a fixed
formula mandating that, unless certain conditions existed, a prison offi-
cial must grant an inmate's request for parole.4" The Court held that
this statute created a protected expectation of parole." The Court ac-
43. Id. The Court refused to accept plaintiff's argument that the practice of trans-
ferring prisoners only for misbehavior created a protected liberty interest. Instead, the
court held that "[w]hatever expectation the prisoner may have in remaining at a partic-
ular prison so long as he behaves himself... is too ephemeral and insubstantial to
trigger procedural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to
transfer... for whatever reason or for no reason at all." Id. By indicating that only
statutes and regulations could give rise to state-created liberty interest, the Court
adopted a narrow view of entitlement analysis. See Gooding, supra note 4, at 155 (dis-
cussing of entitlement analysis). Despite the holding in Meachum, several courts have
employed a broad view of entitlement analysis. See, e.g., Dace v. Mickelson, 816 F.2d
1277, 1279 (8th Cir. 1987) (a prisoner's expectancy is based on a review of state rules,
regulations or practice); Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1422 (1 1th Cir. 1985)
(the court must examine the practices of the prison officials in adihistering the pro-
gram to determine whether the practices place a restriction on official discretion). But
see Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 20 (1981) ("Mutually explicit understanding" that
an inmate would secure parole release does not amount to a state-created liberty inter-
est); Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 459 (1981) (the fact that
seventy-five percent of life inmates received commutations does not create a protected
liberty interest).
44. 442 U.S. 2 (1979).
45. Id. at 12. The Nebraska statute states in pertinent part:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is
eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that
his release should be deferred because:
a. There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
b. His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect
for the law;
c. His release would have a substantial adverse effect on institutional discipline;
d. His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other
training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding
life when released at a later date.
Id., citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1.114(1) (1976).
46. 442 U.S. at 12. The Court rejected respondent's argument that a presumption
of release was not created because the statutory conditions for deferral were essentially
predicative rather than factual. Id. at 13. See infra note 54 for application of this
principle.
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cepted the prisoner's argument that the use of mandatory language in
connection with specifically designated criteria created a liberty inter-
est47 without articulating the reasons for its decision.48 Consequently,
the Court implied that statutory language of a mandatory character
created a protected liberty interest.49
In Hewitt v. Helms,50 the Supreme Court found that statutory lan-
guage of an unmistakably mandatory character was dispositive when
finding a state-created liberty interest regarding daily prison adminis-
tration.5' The statute at issue dictated that prison officials could place
an inmate in administrative segregation only in accordance with speci-
fied criteria.5 2 In Hewitt, the Court held that the statute endowed pris-
oners with a protected liberty interest to remain in the general prison
47. 442 U.S. at 13. The Court also mentioned that because the petitioner brought
the action in federal court, the Court lacked the benefit of the state court's interpreta-
tion of whether the state intended to create an interest. Id. Cf Olim v. Wakenikona,
461 U.S. 238 (1983) (Court based its determination, in part, on the state court's finding
that prison official's discretion to transfer inmate to an out-of-state prison is unfettered).
See infra notes 57-59 for a detailed discussion of Olim.
48. 442 U.S. at 12. The Court did caution, however, that the Nebraska statute was
unique and that entitlement analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Id.
49. Courts have split on the question of whether the absence of mandatory language
precludes a finding that the state has created a protected liberty interest. See Anderson
v. Winsett, 449 U.S. 1093, 1093-96 (1981). In Anderson, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in a Delaware case whereby a parole release statute without mandatory lan-
guage created a protected liberty interest in work release. Two Justices dissented in the
denial of certiorari and proceeded to recognize the split over the issue of mandatory
language in parole release statutes.
50. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
51. Id. at 470-71. The Court hesitated to find a liberty interest in statutes and regu-
lations addressing daily correctional administration and considered the everyday depri-
vations of prison life of little consequence when compared to release from custody
involved in parole release and good time credit decisions. Id. at 470. Additionally, the
Court believed that lower courts should refrain from assuming the role of prison offi-
cials by engaging in constant oversight and intervention in prison administration.
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the mandatory character of the statutes and reg-
ulations created a protected liberty interest. Id.
52. The statute provides in pertinent part:
An inmate may be temporarily confined to Close or Maximum Administrative
Custody in an investigative status upon approval of the officer in charge of the
institution where it has been determined that there is a threat of serious distur-
bance, or a serious threat to the individual or others. The inmate shall be notified
in writing as soon as possible that he is under investigation and that he will receive
a hearing if any disciplinary action is being considered after the investigation is
completed. An investigation shall begin immediately to determine whether or not
a behavior violation has occurred. If no behavior violation has occurred, the in-
mate must be released as soon as the reason for the security concern has abated but
1990]
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population. 3 The Court found that language requiring prison officials
to employ specific procedures and mandating that administrative segre-
gation could not occur without certain substantive predicates was dis-
positive." Explaining its reliance on mandatory language, the Court
reasoned that state laws which simply impose substantive limitations
and elaborate procedural requirements on an official do not create a
protected liberty interest because, at the end of the process, the official
may still exercise unfettered discretion.5" The Court, however, ex-
pressed a caveat that this statute was unique and, therefore, the Court
refrained from rendering mandatory language a formal requirement for
the creation of a protected liberty interest. 6
In two subsequent cases, the Court declined to find state-created lib-
erty interests without resolving the issue of a mandatory language re-
quirement. In Olim v. Wakinekona,"7 the relevant statute provided
that a prison official could transfer an inmate to an out-of-state prison
for any reason.58 Consequently, the Olim Court held that the Hawaii
in all cases within ten days. 459 U.S. at 470-71 n.6 (citing Title 37 PA. CODE §
95.104(b)(3) (1978)).
53. 459 U.S. at 471-72.
54. Id. at 471-72. Noting that the Pennsylvania statute went beyond mere proce-
dural guidelines, the Court believed the statute was unique. Id. at 471. Moreover, the
repeated use of "explicitly mandatory language" requiring that certain procedures
"shall," "will," or "must" be provided in connection with requiring specific substantive
predicates persuaded the Court that the state had created a liberty interest. Id. at 471-
72.
55. 459 U.S. at 471. The Court pointed out that states may formulate guidelines for
reasons other than protection against deprivation of substantive rights. Because states
have this discretion, the Court determined that the state does not create a protected
liberty interest. Id. See also Olim v. Wakenikona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983) (a stat-
ute proviso that a hearing would occur prior to a prisoner's transfer did not create a
protected liberty interest).
56. 458 U.S. at 471-72.
57. 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
58. Id. at 249. The regulation requires:
a hearing prior to a prison transfer involving "a grievous loss to the inmate," which
the Rule defines "generally" as "a serious loss to a reasonable man." . . . An
impartial Program Committee".. . must give the inmate written notice of the
hearing, permit him, with certain stated exceptions, tQ confront and cross-examine
witnesses, afford him an opportunity to be heard, and apprise him of the Commit-
tee's findings....
The committee (which conducts the hearing) is directed to make a recommenda-
tion to the Administrator, who then decides what action to take.
"[The Administrator] may, as the final decisionmaker:
"(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or
"(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or
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statute did not create a protected liberty interest. 9 Because the statute
made no attempt to curtail official discretion, the Court never ad-
dressed the mandatory language issue. In Board of Pardons v. Allen, 60
the Court held that a Montana statute, semantically identical to the
statute in Greenholtz, created a protected liberty interest in parole re-
lease.61 The Court, in Allen, found the presence of mandatory lan-
guage as the key factor in the creation of a state-created liberty
interest.62 By relying on Greenholtz, however, the Court did not need
to determine that mandatory language must be present in order to cre-
ate a protected liberty interest.
63
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson," presented the
Court with an opportunity to review the semantic criteria that states
must include in order to create a protected liberty interest.65 In
Thompson, the Court explicitly endorsed the requirement of
mandatory language for entitlement to due process protection.66 Jus-
welfare of the staff, inmate..., other inmates. . ., institution, or community and
refer the matter back to the Program Committee for further study and
recommendation.
Id. at 242-43 (footnotes omitted) (citing the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of
the Correction Department).
59. 461 U.S. at 249-50.
60. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
61. Id. at 381. The Montana statute provides that a prisoner eligible for parole
"shall" be released when there is a reasonable probability that no detriment will result
to him or the community, and specifies that parole shall be ordered for the best interests
of society and when the Board of Pardons believes that the prisoner is willing and able
to assume the obligations of a law-abiding citizen. Id. at 376-77.
62. Id. at 381. The Court determined that a statute demanding parole release "un-
less" certain findings are made is no different from a statute mandating release "if,"
"when" or "subject to" such findings being made. Id. at 378. According to the Court,
both types of language create a protected liberty interest. Id.
63. Id. at 381. The Court based this comparison on the fact that the Montana stat-
ute, like the statute in Greenholtz, granted the official broad, subjective discretion. Id.
See supra note 45 for the Greenholtz statute. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)
(addressing a similar statute, the Court held that the absence of objective and defined
criteria did not create a protected liberty interest). See supra notes 38-43 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Meachum.
64. 109S. Ct. 1904 (1989). See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text for detailed
outline of the facts.
65. 109 S. Ct. at 1906. The Court explained that its focus on entitlement analysis
concerned the language of the relevant statute, not the relative significance of the value
at stake. Id. at 1909.
66. Id. at 1910. Citing Greenholtz, Hewitt and Allen, the Court noted that the
mandatory language requirement was implicit in earlier decisions. Id. See supra notes
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tice Blackmun, writing for the majority, first reaffirmed that substan-
tive criteria, which guide and limit official decision-making, are
necessary for creation of a protected liberty interest.67 In connection
with these limitations on official discretion, the Court added that regu-
lations must also contain explicitly mandatory language requiring that,
once relevant criteria had been met, the prison official must reach a
particular result.68
The Court then applied this standard to the Kentucky regulation
governing visiting privileges.69 The Court recognized that the reasons
for which prison officials may refuse visitors sufficiently limited official
discretion to satisfy the substantive predicate requirement. 7' Neverthe-
less, the Court found that the regulation lacked the requisite
mandatory language. 71 The Court noted that the phrase "may exclude
visitors" gave the prison official a residual amount of discretion permit-
ting the official to allow or disallow visits regardless of the substantive
predicates. 72 As support for this determination, the Thompson Court
38-63 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the evolution of the mandatory
language requirement.
67. 109 S. Ct. at 1909. While the Court stated that a state can create a protected
liberty interest in several ways, the Court cautioned that "neither the drafting of regula-
tions nor their interpretation can be reduced to an exact science. Our past decisions
suggest, however, that the most common manner in which a State creates a liberty
interest is by establishing 'substantive predicates' to govern official decision making."
Id. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of how substantive
predicates create a protected liberty interest.
68. 109 S. Ct. at 1910. The Court formulated guidelines for determining whether or
not a statute, rule or regulation created a protected liberty interest in stating that "[t]he
use of 'explicitly mandatory language' in connection with the establishment of specific
'substantive predicates' to limit discretion forces a conclusion that the state has created
a liberty interest." Id. The Court indicated that the mandatory language requirement
was not an open invitation for courts to search regulations to find any imperatives. Id.
at 1910 n.4. See infra note 74 for the application of this principle to the Thompson facts.
69. 109 S. Ct. at 1910. The Court initially determined that the loss of visiting rights
does not directly implicate the due process clause because the suspension of such a
privilege is contemplated by an inmate's original sentence and does not otherwise vio-
late the Constitution. Id. at 1908-09.
The Court rejected petitioner's plea for the Court to distinguish statutes and regula-
tions affecting the duration or release from confinement from those governing daily
administration, regardless of the language used. Believing such a finding unnecessary to
rule in petitioner's favor, the Court expressed no view on the proposal and left its reso-
lution for "another day." Id. at 1909 n.3.
70. 109 S. Ct. at 1910. See supra note 16 for the grounds on which the Kentucky
regulation suggested prison officials could exclude visitors.
71. 109 S. Ct. at 1910.
72. Id. at 1911. The Court reasoned that, according to the language of the regula-
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indicated that the introduction to the regulation reserved the right of
the prison official to exercise discretion regarding visitation rights.7"
Furthermore, the Court noted that mandatory language describing vis-
itation procedures was not relevant to its inquiry, because the proce-
dures arose only after the officials decided to allow visitors.74 Finding
this lack of mandatory language dispositive, the Court held that the
Kentucky regulation did not create a protected liberty interest.75
The dissent7 6 criticized the majority's determination that mandatory
language is an essential element in the creation of a protected liberty
interest. 7 Writing for the dissent, Justice Marshall argued that once
substantive criteria limit official discretion, there is no reason to assume
that prison officials will disregard those criteria absent mandatory lan-
tion, visitors need not be excluded if they fall within one of the described categories, nor
must one of the described conditions exist for a visitor to be excluded. Id. See supra
note 16 for text of the prison's visiting regulation.
73. 109 S. Ct. at 1911. See supra note 15 for text of the policy statement. In ad-
dressing the language of the consent decree, which the Sixth Circuit found sufficiently
mandatory to create a protected liberty interest, the Court viewed the language as
mandatory only in the sense that it prevented the state from making its regulations
more restrictive than they were at the time the District Court entered the decree. The
decree, however, did not limit official discretion in determining whether or not to ex-
clude a certain visitor. 109 S. Ct. at 1911 n.5. See supra note 18 and accompanying text
for the Court of Appeals holding. See supra note 14 for text of the consent decree.
74. 109 S. Ct. at 1911. The Court provided examples of mandatory language within
the regulation that it considered irrelevant. For example, each inmate is allowed three
separate visits per week. This directive, however, says nothing regarding admittance of
any particular visitor. Id. at 1910-11 n.4.
75. Id. at 1910. The Court reasoned that the regulations lacked language sufficient
for an inmate to reasonably expect to enforce the regulations against a prison official.
Likewise, an inmate could not reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit
would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions. Id.
76. Id. Justice Marshall dissented, with whom Justices Brennan and Stevens joined.
77. Id. at 1914. In his dissent, Marshall implied that the Court should return to
impact analysis, lamenting over the emasculated form of impact analysis the courts
have utilized since Montanye. Id. at 1911-12. See supra notes 4, 28-32 for a definition
of impact analysis and its application in earlier decisions. Marshall asserted that the
Montanye impact inquiry "knows few rivals for vagueness and pliability" because the
typical prison sentence provides nothing more than that an individual must spend a
period of time in incarceration. Id. at 1912. Therefore, Marshall argued the inquiry
contemplates everything and nothing at all. Id. at 1912. See supra notes 36 and 65 and
accompanying text for the Montanye test and the majority's application of it. Marshall
prefers the form of impact analysis used in Morrissey. See supra notes 27-32 for a dis-
cussion and application of impact analysis. Analyzing the facts in light of the Morrissey
impact analysis, Marshall found that the suspension of visiting privileges constitutes a
grievous loss. 109 S. Ct. at 1912.
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guage.7" Although conceding the mandatory language requirement,
the dissent nonetheless believed that the majority erred in holding that
such language was not present in the Kentucky regulation.79 The dis-
sent reasoned that the existence of twenty pages of mandatory proce-
dures governing inmate visits trumped the caveat in the introduction.80
Consequently, the dissent asserted that the language in the regulation
created an objective expectation that prisoners could have visitors ab-
sent the occurrence of specified conditions."1 The regulation, there-
fore, created a protected liberty interest.8 2
The majority's holding that the Kentucky prison regulation did not
create a protected liberty interest in visitation privileges is correct for
two reasons. First, the Court eliminated confusion by explicitly advo-
cating the mandatory language requirement which was implicit in prior
case history." Second, although a formalistic approach to prisoners'
rights gives a great deal of power to the drafters of prison regulations,
the Court's two step analysis prevents abuses of this power. The Court
must make sure that prison officials have not caused a prisoner to suffer
adverse consequences not contemplated by his or her original sentence
before reaching the question of statutory entitlement.8 4 Consequently,
lawmakers cannot reduce prisoners to slaves of the state by simply em-
ploying the Court's linguistic formula.85
78. Id. at 1914. Because the criteria contained in the regulation are regularly em-
ployed in practice, Marshall contends that the inmates develop legitimate expectations
worthy of due process protection. Marshall further contends that the use of the word
"may" does not defeat this expectation. Id. See supra note 39 and accompanying text
for the deference given an inmate's expectations in due process proceedings.
79. 109 S. Ct. at 1915.
80. Id. In light of all the sources of mandatory language contained within the Ken-
tucky regulation, Marshall found the caveat and the word "may" as mere "boilerplate"
language. Id. at 1916.
81. Id. at 1915-16.
82. Id. at 1916. Marshal asserts that the majority's holding cannot be reconciled
with Hewitt because of identical semantic schemes using the word "may." Id. See
supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the language in Hewitt.
83. Id. at 1910. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
evolution of the mandatory language requirement.
84. Id. at 1908. See supra note 69 for the application of the Court's first step in
determining whether or not a protectable interest exists. See supra note 77 and accom-
panying text for the dissent's criticism of this method of analysis.
85. See supra note 39 and accompanying text illustrating how the two-step analysis
prevents tyrannical abuses of power. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 478 (1980) (in-
mate could not be transferred to a mental hospital without due process because such
transfer was not contemplated by his original sentence).
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Although the Thompson majority does not engage in a discussion of
policy, the Court's holding reflects policy considerations expressed in
earlier decisions.86 Thompson illustrates the Court's reluctance to pe-
nalize prison officials who take salutary steps in prison administration.
The semantic standard that the Court articulates facilities this goal.
Prisons are already understaffed and insufficiently funded. If every set
of guidelines triggered the due process clause, the resulting procedures
necessary to accompany every official decision would greatly hinder the
effective daily operation of prisons. The administrative and financial
burdens of holding hearings to monitor daily decision-making would
also siphon valuable resources away from beneficial programs such as
prisoner education and counseling. Eventually, states might refrain
from placing any limits on official discretion or engaging in prison re-
form simply to circumvent the strictures of the due process clause.
The test for entitlement to due process protection in Thompson allows
state law-makers and prison officials to draft statutes and prison regu-
lations aimed to improve prison conditions without transforming the
details of daily prison life into protected liberty interests.8 7
The guidelines in Thompson recognize the need to strike the balance
between the rights of prisoners and the independence of prison officials.
Thompson narrows the source of protected liberty interests in order to
keep prison administration in the hands of prison officials. The corre-
sponding loss to the inmates, however, is not significant because
Thompson addresses an area of daily administration where the loss of a
privilege is relatively minor.88 While the Court has held that prisoners
are entitled to the fundamental rights of life, liberty and property, the
Court's decision in Thompson preserves these fundamental rights.8 9
Robyn Simon*
86. See supra notes 41, 47 and accompanying text for a policy discussion regarding
judicial reluctance to usurp independence of prison officials.
87. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). The Court in Hewitt noted the irony
of holding that when a State embarks on such desirable experimentation as prison re-
form, it thereby opens the door to scrutiny by the federal courts. Meanwhile, states
choosing not to adopt such procedural provisions avoid the strictures of the due process
clause entirely. Id. at 471.
88. See supra note 51 for a discussion of the policy behind the inception of the
mandatory language requirement.
89. See supra notes 68, 69, 83 and accompanying text discussing how the decision in
Thompson preserves prisoners' fundamental rights.
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